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This article explores the political dynamics of labor migration in the Middle East. It seeks
to explain the politics of Arab population movements by looking at historical trends in
regional integration and contends that migration to the oil-rich countries, including
refugee flows, has been the key factor driving Arab integration in the absence of
effective institutions and economic integration processes. To account for the influence
of this largely forgotten factor, the article looks at the formal and informal institutions
that have shaped massive labor flows from the 1970s onward. It offers historical
evidence pointing to the role of migration in Arab regional integration by looking at
free circulation of Eritrean refugees and migrants in the Arab region using oral history
and administrative archives. Linking labor migration, refugee movements, and regional
politics, the article introduces the concept of “migration diplomacy” as an analytical
framework and argues that the politics of regional integration can be better understood
when looked at through the lens of migration.
Introduction: Magnitude and Complexity of Migration in the Middle East
The world’s highest ratio of migrants to national population is to be found in the
Middle East,1 and the region is one of the most fascinating arenas in which to
observe international labor flows. Economic migration and forced displacement
have led to the formation of a highly integrated regional labor market. Labor
migration is one of the most dynamic economic factors in the Middle East,
and remittances sent home by migrant workers in the region exceed the value
of regional trade in goods2 as well as official capital flows.3 The growth of
migrant labor in the Middle East was both rapid and massive and went hand
in hand with the development of the oil economy. The stock of migrants went
from 800,000 to 1.8 million between 1970 and 1975.4 In the 1980s, the Middle
East became the largest market for migrant labor the world has ever known,
and, according to Sharon Stanton Russell and Michael Teitelbaum, just before
the 1991 Gulf War the oil-rich states of the Arab Gulf taken together numbered
more than seven million migrants, five million of whom were workers.5
Migration to the oil-rich countries accounts for an overwhelming part of
migratory trends in the region. In the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC)
countries, some 37.1 percent of the population is foreign, with the United
Arab Emirates (UAE) hosting up to eighty-one percent of migrants, and
foreign workers constituting at least seventy-five percent of the workforce in
Saudi Arabia, eighty-two percent in Kuwait, and almost ninety percent in
Qatar and the UAE at the beginning of the 2000s.6
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Since the mid-1950s, the region has also played host to one of the largest
refugee populations in the world. Numbering approximately 900,000 in 1950,
1.3 million in the 1960s, 1.6 million in the 1970s, and 2 million in the 1980s,
the Palestinian refugee population has grown steadily since 1947 to 4.5
million today.7 Not including Sudanese internally displaced (IDP) and inter-
national refugees, the extended region itself holds more than six million refu-
gees, who include some 4.5 million Palestinian refugees (exiles from 1947,
1967, and 1973 and their descendants) and approximately 1.5 million Iraqis in
Syria and Jordan since 2006.8 In smaller but significant numbers, the region
has also been harboring refugees from the horn of Africa: Eritreans in Sudan,
Yemen, and Saudi Arabia since the 1960s and the war of independence
against Ethiopia, as well as Somali populations from Ethiopia and Somalia in
Yemen since the 1980s and increasingly since 1991. Palestinians as well as
other refugees (Eritrean, Somalis, Sudanese, etc.) from first to third generation
are generally included in foreign labor statistics, notably in GCC states.
Considering the magnitude of the migratory phenomenon in such a highly
strategic region, one may find it hard to understand the relative paucity of
research on the politics of migration. Early work lamented the absence of
migration-related research and data on the Middle East. Part of the gap in
knowledge has been filled, but mainly for sending countries and mostly at the
macroregional level. An extensive body of literature deals with the macroeco-
nomic effects of labor migration in sending countries. The impact of remittances
on local economies is still a question open to debate, and its evaluation in terms
of development efficiency and sustainability remains controversial.9 However,
migration to the Gulf states is considered to have accelerated the development
of Egypt and Yemen, of certain regions of India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, the
Philippines, Indonesia, Sri Lanka, and Malaysia, and to have sustained the
direct livelihood of many in the Palestinian-occupied territories as well as the
survival of the economy itself. More detailed analyses on the sociology of
labor migration are still to be done, especially in receiving countries. After a
surge in interest in intraregional population movements in the 1970s and
1980s in the wake of the oil boom, migration research in the Middle East
remained confined to applied economic research and international organization
reports. One of the reasons for neglecting the impact of migration on Middle
Eastern politics can be attributed to the fact that migration trends were expected
to be temporary and meant to decline in the 1990s.10 Since the 2000s, demogra-
phers, historians, and political scientists have taken a second look at one of the
key factors of social and economic change in the region both in receiving and
sending countries.11
The complexity of the underlying patterns of migration from and within the
Middle East has long been emphasized,12 and different migration systems
are centered on subregional zones (the Mashrek, the Arabian Peninsula, the
Afro-Arab zone) with different emigration and immigration drivers (popu-
lation, economics, security, international relations). The dominant features of
mobility in the region nonetheless lie with two major factors: the oil economy
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and conflict. The labor-intensive development of the oil economy in GCC states
and Libya since the 1970s accounts for massive levels of economic migration
taking the form of contract labor, often deemed temporary, while the
Arab-Israeli conflicts (1947, 1967, 1973), the first Gulf War (the Iran-Iraq con-
flict, 1980–1988), and the two subsequent ones (the Gulf wars that started in
1991 and 2003) account for persistent waves of refugees. Conflict is generally
presented as a key determinant for population movements in the Middle
East.13 Be it the Palestinian exiles in the Gulf, the migrants’ exodus from
Kuwait in the wake of the 1991 invasion by Iraq, or the Iraqi presence in
Jordan and Syria after 2003, the main factor behind these short-lived and see-
mingly short-term waves of forced migration is war. More general structural
and political determinants of labor-force mobility have rarely been explored.
In this article, we examine migration patterns in the oil-rich countries using
the dual lens of war and political/economic factors and analyze the impact these
patterns have had on regional integration. Considering the scarcity of sources on
migration policy, asylum policy, and refugee law in a context where most macro-
historical migration trends can be accounted for by informal practices, one must
complement administrative and political documentation with oral history and
interviews. We focus on the empirical case study of the migration politics sur-
rounding the Eritrean refugees during the war of independence against
Ethiopia (1962–1991) using administrative archives to highlight the political
dimension of labor migration.
Labor Migration in the Middle East: A Critical Narrative
The narrative of labor migration in the Middle East is well known and
thoroughly documented.14 The literature has largely emphasized the economic
and demographic determinants of labor import,15 and there have been many
contributions to the analysis of the political economy and political demography
of Arab intra-regional migrations in the 1970s and the 1980s.16 Oil-rich states
have long argued that their migration policies were in fact depoliticized along
the line of classical economics, arguments in favor of laissez-faire policy.17
Their deeds belie this argument: What they have in fact engineered is a political
management of migration flows. Contrary to Nazli Choucri, who considers the
initial phases of Arab labor migration in the GCC countries “individual,”
“private,” and nonpolitical compared to a “state”-managed Asian labor
import in the 1980s,18 and in support of Sharon Staton Russell, we will argue
that migration to the region has always been politicized along lines that vary
across time and countries.
After the Second World War, the development of oil production in the
sparsely populated Arabian Peninsula led to a massive increase in labor
demand and an urgent need for foreign workers in Saudi Arabia, the United
Arab Emirates, Kuwait, Qatar, and Bahrain. The oil-producing countries’
demand for labor was mainly met by regional inflows from highly populated
neighboring Arab countries like Yemen and Egypt and, to a lesser extent,
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Jordan, Syria, and Iraq, or displaced populations like Palestinian refugees after
1947. Almost all categories of workers were targeted by public and private
recruiters in the oil-producing states, from domestic laborers and construction
workers to blue- and white-collar workers, in the private and public sector.
The shift in price-setting power for crude oil from Western-owned private
or semi-private oil companies (ARAMCO or British Petroleum) to the Arab
states of the Peninsula led to a massive increase in oil prices, further enhanced
by the regional political context. During tafra (the period of high oil income
from 1973 to 1986–1987), growth, state building, and massive inflows of
mainly Arab immigrants shaped the countries political development. The
steady increase in oil demand and the oil embargo of 1973–1974 generated enor-
mous income for oil-producing countries’ and put them on a rapid but “exten-
sive” development path heavily reliant on labor import. Within a decade, oil
revenues tripled (from two hundred billion dollars for the 1971–1975 period
to six hundred billion dollars for the 1976–1980 period), and oil-financed socio-
economic development programs targeting infrastructures, education, industry,
services, agriculture, etc., triggered a massive flow of contract labor into econom-
ies lacking a sufficient and adequately skilled or trained workforce. Most oil-
producing countries therefore hinged heavily on foreign labor to achieve econ-
omic development. As a result, in the 1970s, seventy-two percent of the labor
force in the GCC countries was foreign. The most cited studies on migration
during the oil boom come from the numerous data surveys, policy-oriented
reports,19 and articles20 conducted by the International Labor Organization’s
team of economists.
Interestingly enough, economic and demographic factors of migration fail
to account completely for the counterintuitive variations in the volume of
migration during the late-1980s economic recession. Analysts agree that the
collapse of oil revenue caused neither a large-scale reexport of foreign labor
nor a drastic fall in regional migration levels.21 The lack of correlation
between economic factors and migration is mainly due to political pressure on
migration policies. Recession nevertheless saw a change in migratory trends.
With migration patterns extending further and further “eastward,” immigration
from Southeast Asia started increasing while Arab labor was either left unre-
newed or simply replaced.
This change in the composition of the migrant labor force took place pro-
gressively. Asian workers had been present in the Gulf since the 1940s, notably
in former British residency states. The circulation of indentured labor and the
activity of the British East India Company in the Indian Ocean saw a first
inflow of Commonwealth workers from Pakistan and India to the trade,
service, and administrative sectors. The 1820 Treaty, which put Gulf Trucial
states or sheikhdoms under British supervision for commercial and strategic
matters, further accelerated this process. In the 1930s, the British imported
large numbers of Indian workers in order to secure control of the oil sector in
the Gulf.22 In 1975 there were around two million foreign workers in the oil-
producing states, sixty-eight percent of them Arab and the rest mainly from
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Asia, with a small proportion of skilled occidental workers. In 1983 the number
of foreign workers increased to five million, of whom fifty-five percent were
Arabs. The proportion of Arab workers kept declining throughout the 1980s
and the 1990s as Arab nonnational populations continued to grow in absolute
numbers in the GCC countries. The change was more brutal in some countries
than others: Between 1975 and 1985, the relative share of the Arab foreign
workforce in Saudi Arabia went down from ninety to thirty-two percent.23 In
the 1980s, 44.3 percent of the three million Egyptian expatriates returned
from Libya and the oil-producing countries, particularly in 1986 and 1989.
Often called the “third and fourth phases” of migration,24 Asian migration
became more complex in the 1980s and onward, including an increasing
variety of nationalities (South Korea, Taiwan, Indonesia, Philippines,
Thailand); this trend afforded the GCC countries more autonomy vis-a`-vis
Arab-sending countries on the regional and international political scenes.
As early as the 1960s, Arab immigrants started to be considered a source of
political activism and a potential threat to the states and regimes of the GCC.
Arab diasporas constituted a transnational network through which issues
could travel and political action could be organized outside the purview of the
host states, if not in direct opposition to them. The risk of “foreign agitation”
was obviously put forward by GCC states in moments of crisis, as Robert
Vitalis has shown for the 1950s labor unrest in Saudi Arabia’s Eastern province.
But the GCC states also came to see them as a more substantial or existential
threat to national identity. Naturalization, which the oil-rich countries had
opened to “ethnic” Arab migrants in the 1960s and the beginning of the
1970s, had become virtually impossible by the mid-1970s. Strict nationality
and citizenship laws based on lineage were enforced, preventing non-nationals
from gaining access to socioeconomic and political rights and cutting them off
from the benefits of patrimonial welfare politics. The change in the composition
of immigration and the selective preference given to Asian migrants in the 1980s
may also be seen as an illustration of these “anti-integration” policies aimed at
controlling the boundaries of the nation and excluding non-nationals from both
the welfare system and the polity.25 Disenfranchised and likely to be “passive
observers of political processes rather than potential activists or claimants on
social services and other benefits of citizenship,”26 Asian workers were not
meant to gain access to indigenous resources and political participation.
Beyond its economic rationale and the response to immediate market
incentives, the selection of foreign workers illustrated a regional political strat-
egy. Oil-producing states have justified their labor import policies on the basis of
cost effectiveness. But along with the mechanic effects of push-pull factors and
labor shortages, the dynamics of labor migration also require a thorough analy-
sis of the policies and motivations that help determine the nature and volume of
migrant labor flows. And in the case of the Arab region, politics as much as
economic rationale seem to have shaped the trends of labor circulation.
Several “migration crises”27 occurring at different levels point to the politi-
cal nature of migration. Most interestingly, their study lends credit to the idea,
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initially posited by Nazli Choucri about the 1980s phases of Asian migration,
that the origins and composition of migrant worker populations should be inter-
preted as the joint result of public policies of both sending and receiving
countries.
The case of Thailand is exemplary at the binational level. Yearly streams of
labor from Thailand to the GCC rose from a few individuals to 105,016 between
1973 and 1982,28 with a large number of Thai workers going to Saudi Arabia,
and continued until the Saudi government ruled out Thai immigration after a
diplomatic clash in 1990. After a heist and the murder of three Saudi diplomats
and a businessman in Bangkok, the Saudi government gave amot d’ordre of not
renewing 250,000 Thai workers’ visas and work permits in June 1990, signaling
the exclusion of Thailand from a blooming migration circuit in Southeast Asia.29
The Gulf War of 1991 provides a massive illustration of the important role
played by migration politics. In the wake of the invasion of Kuwait by Saddam
Hussein, the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) and the governments
of Jordan and Yemen expressed more or less explicit support for Iraq. It not
only proved to be a clumsy international positioning but also a dangerous pol-
itical move for their citizens in the GCC countries. The 1991 “migration crisis”
led to the expulsion of 800,000 Egyptians from Iraq, Jordan, and Kuwait;30
731,800 Yemeni from Saudi Arabia (according to the Central Statistical
Bureau in Sana’a); and close to a million returnees from other GCC countries,31
as well as some 350,000 Palestinians from Kuwait and 100,000 from Saudi
Arabia.32 In total, an estimated two million Arab workers and dependents
left the Gulf. This movement had massive repercussions on the political
economy of labor migration in the Middle East.33 First and foremost, it acceler-
ated the replacement of Arabs by Asian and Southeast Asian workers and
clearly highlighted the political nature of labor imports.
Regional Integration and Labor Migration
Regionalism and regional integration have long presented difficulties for scho-
lars struggling to capture the “evolving architecture of regionalization.”34
Most research on regionalism has gone beyond the analysis of geographical
or politically integrated units in an effort to describe complex sets of interactions
within groups of actors or zones. For that matter, Louise Fawcett contrasts the
soft regionalism of the Arab world and the hard regionalism of the European
Union, insisting on a spectrum that goes from one to the other, from a sense
of awareness or community to the consolidation of pan- or subregional
groups and networks through common institutions and organizations.35
Social-constructivist approaches applied to political identity in the Arab
world36 have helped define the political integration processes beyond the
crude measurement of hard factors such as state power, intergovernmental
cooperation, supranational delegation of sovereignty, and formal institutionali-
zation of interdependence. In the Middle Eastern case, in order to evaluate the
efficiency of economic integration processes, one needs to measure the degree of
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integration between labor markets provided through both formal and informal
kinds of regulation. And this task requires, among other things, that labor
migration be brought under scrutiny. Our interest lies in the overlapping of
these two aspects of regional integration, and in this respect it is critical to
take into account the politics of labor migration in the Middle East.
On the one hand, the literature on Arab regional integration generally
laments the weakness of intraregional exchanges and the inefficiency of regional
institutions. It tends to paint a “gloomy picture” of Arab integration, depicting
instead the conditions of Arab “disintegration.”37 Regional integration is
deemed to have failed, according to economic indicators and institutional cri-
teria posited by the theoretical literature on regionalism.38 United Nations
and World Bank reports confirmed in the late 1990s39 that indicators of liberal-
ization of trade and economic interdependence were still low despite insti-
tutional proliferation, including the 1998 Greater Arab Free Trade
Agreement. Between 1985 and 1990, intraregional trade accounted for only
six and seven percent of total export from and import to the Middle East.
The integration of labor markets since the 1960s, epitomized by the case of
the oil-rich countries, is nonetheless generally understated as an economic
factor of integration. One could argue that it has not only compensated for
the failure of commodity market integration and weak corporate capital flows,
but also that it has constituted a pioneering experiment in global labor-market
integration that resulted from successive phases of globalization.
On the other hand, the most salient characteristic of Arab regional inte-
gration is the sense of community based on a shared language,40 a set of
shared values, and the loose sense of collective identity linked to Arabness.
Beyond essentialism, the politics of identity in the Middle East has been a
key issue and a strategic factor in the social construction of the “Arab world.”
The cultural dimension of Arab integration was massively represented in the lit-
erature in and on the region during the Cold War, especially as it served and
illustrated the endeavor of pan-Arab politics. The politics of shared identity
led Arab thinkers like Zaki al Arsuzi to evoke the possibility of an Arab
regional citizenship that would unite all Arab national identities within an
“exemplary republic.”41
Discourses on Arab integration in fact dwell more on the ambition of a pol-
itical project that aimed to unify and homogenize the region rather than on
actual institutional integration.42 Through the creation of the League of Arab
States in 1945 and subsequently of the United Arab Republic (UAR) in 1958,
Arab political leaders and transnational activists sought unity43 rather than inte-
gration. Arabism was presented as a challenge to a postcolonial nation-state-
centered regional order based on ethnocultural grounds by Egyptian and
Syrian presidents Gamal Abdel Nasser and Shukri al-Quwati, who signed the
treaty founding the UAR. In turn, the UAR served as an instrument of hege-
mony for both “Arab republics” and for the Ba’ath party, enabling them to mon-
opolize the legitimate discourse on Arabness and Arab integration for at least
two decades. Historians of Arabism and analysts generally overlook the role
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of labor market integration within the wider process and focus on the intellec-
tual and institutional history of regional integration. Three factors can
account for this lack of attention. First, the main actors of migration manage-
ment, the oil-rich states, came from countries that were not portrayed as key
actors of Arabism. Second, migration politics are “low” politics compared to
high politics and diplomatic endeavors. Third, most of the regulation and insti-
tutions relevant to labor migration were, and still are, semiformal or informal,
bilateral at best, and failed to give birth to standing regional organizations.
Oral history and the history of administrative practices regarding asylum and
entry and exit policies open up an additional dimension of regional integration
significant enough to reappraise the process as a whole.
The Informal Politics of Labor Migration in the Middle East: Migration as
Diplomacy
The process of regional integration in the Middle East is atypical with regard to
other models such as Europe or even the Americas: It has mainly been fueled by
formally or informally regulated labor-force transfers between countries in the
region.44 Therefore, we argue that migration policy should be analyzed as an
indirect form of foreign policy that uses the selection of migrants and
quasi-asylum policies as diplomacy.
At the regional level, patterns of worker mobility organized along the lines
of regional and international politics have been a key to understanding what
could be called the Arab “migration diplomacy.” This diplomacy is nonetheless
to be understood as including formal and informal, public and private diplo-
macy. Bypassing the channels of formal institutions and agreements, the politics
of workers’ circulation has been shaped by the decisions of both public and
private actors, state administration, and embassies on a bilateral and temporary
basis, and by firms and recruitment companies on a contractual business basis.
Most sending countries have created public institutions to manage and organize
labor emigration while at the same time retaining a public-private partnership in
the management of migration flows: Overseas employment ministries, agencies,
and offices flourished in Asia in the 1970s (the Overseas Employment
Corporation established in 1976 in Pakistan and 1979 in Bangladesh, the
Office of Overseas Employment Service Administration in Thailand, the
Korea Overseas Development Corporation in South Korea). But similar insti-
tutions also started to appear in the Arab sending countries in the 1970s. The
1971 Egyptian constitution mentions the competence of the state in managing
migration flows, and the 1981 presidential decree (n8574) defines the compe-
tence of the Ministry of Emigration Affairs and Egyptians Abroad until the
Ministry of Manpower and Emigration was created in 1996 (presidential
decree n831) and the Supreme Committee of Emigration was created in 1997.
In the receiving countries, the politics of labor import from the 1960s to the
1980s was characterized by a clear preference granted to Arab immigrants in
oil-rich countries that was not formalized by bilateral agreements or migration
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quotas. Nevertheless, the patterns of regional migration politics followed those
of regional integration politics.45 In the context of Arab regional integration
politics, fostered by pan-Arab ideologies, migration was the only field of
actual integration between states and economies. Labor migration, its regu-
lation, and the social, cultural, and financial flows that go with it are the very
domain in which Arab integration has taken concrete form.46 Arab migrant
worker flows and the remittances of capital they generated “have been the
most important feature of regional integration”47 in the Middle East.
The sequence of Arab labor circulation and regional integration of labor
markets lags behind the institutional history of Arabism. Five major historical
phases are generally identified in the saga of Arabism: the intellectual premises
(nineteenth and early twentieth century), the rise (from the Palestinian uprising
of the 1930s to the Egyptian revolution of 1952), the consolidation (from the
Egyptian to the Iraqi revolution of 1958), the decline (1958-1967), and the
demise after 1967.48 The first wave of regional integration through labor
migration came as a result of the war of 1947-1948 and the creation of the
state of Israel, which caused the exodus of around 700,000 Palestinian Arabs,
who relocated mainly in the then-Jordanian West Bank or Cisjordan area but
also fled to Jordan, Lebanon, and Syria, and in smaller numbers to the Arab
peninsula. The 1967 war generated subsequent waves of Palestinian refugees
who either left the Palestinian-occupied territory or the first country of
asylum to reach the oil-rich states and the better work opportunities they
offered. Between 1947 and 1960, the population of Kuwait doubled, and the pro-
portion of non-Kuwaiti in the population rose to fifty-three percent in 1965 with
around thirty percent of all non-Kuwaitis being Palestinian.49 In 1975,
twenty-five percent of the Saudi Arabian workforce was Yemeni (from North
Yemen). Around sixty percent of the Jordanian labor force was working in
the Gulf during the 1970s, including both Jordanians and Palestinians with
Jordanian passports. The share of foreign Arab population in the oil-producing
countries rose dramatically and started raising problems of national integration
for the receiving states, which were later reformulated as issues of national
security. The governments in Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE started devel-
opment policies in the late 1980s, raising requirements for participation by
nationals in the workforce.
In the sending countries, exit visa procedures were lightened in the 1960s
and 1970s. Egypt’s political and cultural capital within the region directly bene-
fited its diaspora.50 Egypt suspended previous restrictive emigration policies in
1973 while launching the infitah (open door) politics, and in 1974, exit visa
requirements were suppressed for emigrants.51 Egyptian migrants within the
Arab world in the 1960s were predominantly skilled workers, mainly teachers
and administrators. At the beginning of the 1970s, they joined with flows of
Palestinian, Jordanian/Palestinian, and Syrian but also Iraqi and Lebanese
workers, giving rise to a massive wave of both skilled and unskilled migration
to the Gulf. In turn, the sending countries were also attracting other categories
of immigrants. Egypt and Lebanon served as an educational hub in the region
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with prestigious universities for students and intellectuals from the rest of the
region and Africa; Lebanon attracted unskilled workers from neighboring
countries; and Egypt attracted Sudanese unskilled workers. The idea of an inte-
grated Arab labor market was pervasive in the 1970s, and some policy makers
considered treating the Arab region as a single territory, with mobility being
one of the many forms of interaction possible between state units. In 1957 the
League of Arab States commissioned its Economic Council to promote the prin-
ciple of freedom of movement for workers, and in 1965 the first conference of
Arab Labor Ministers endorsed the principle. In 1967 an agreement was
signed by Jordan, Syria, and Egypt to call for free circulation of workers in
the region.
None of the main receiving countries signed the agreement, and the oil-
producing countries steadily refused to sign any binding convention concerning
the access to their labor markets for foreign nationals. Even though oil-rich
states participated in the Arab integration process in a subdued but extremely
efficient fashion, they failed to reap the political benefits of this participation.
The Arabian Peninsula was indeed considered a minor eulogist of Arabist poli-
tics compared to the vocal advocacy of Nasser’s Egypt, Ba’ath-led countries like
Iraq and Syria, or the socialist People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen since
1970.52 In the case of the oil-producing countries, pan-Arabism was, as Michael
Barnett puts it, an “informal institution” rather than a set of organizations.53
The change in the selection of migrants engineered in the 1980s was also
done with a view to securing more independence for oil-rich states from their
traditional sources of labor. The political momentum of the oil-rich states can
be measured through their ability to control migration patterns from the
1980s onward. The informal coalition was institutionalized in 1981 with the cre-
ation of the GCC states. Oil-rich countries proved able to implicitly shape the
dynamics of regional politics. In 1983 fifty-five percent of the five million
foreign workers in the GCC states were Arabs. As previously explained, the
proportion of Arab labor slowly declined throughout the 1980s, and by 1995
Asian workers outnumbered Arab nationals by one million in the GCC
countries.54 Putting cost-of-labor factors to the fore, which heavily favored the
import of Asian labor, the oil-producing countries diversified away from the
integrated Arab labor market and staunched the quasi dependence of certain
sectors of their economies on Egyptian labor.
Migration policy is indeed an indirect instrument of foreign policy, and the
opening and closing of borders on the receiving or sending side have been used
as tools of political leverage, as shown by Nazli Choucri in the case of the
Libya-Egypt migration couple.55 Beyond regional logics, bilateral meetings
and negotiations between state officials, diplomats, businessmen, and recruit-
ment agencies contributed to engineer the patterns of labor migration
between “migration couples.” These processes hardly ever gave way to formal-
ized and perennial agreements. Much more than the short-term political weapon
they have often been used as, migration flows have proven in the long run to be a
key factor shaping regional politics.
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Migration Policy as Asylum Policy by Proxy: The Palestinian and the Eritrean
Case
Today, more than eighty-eight percent of registered Palestinian refugees (4.7
million) are located in Arab near-eastern countries,56 and more than half a
million of them were still in the Gulf57 after the expulsion of approximately
450,000 from the region after the 1991 Gulf War due to the position adopted
by the Palestinian Authority. Neither Saudi Arabia nor the Gulf states are
party to the 1951 Geneva Convention, the 1965 Casablanca Protocol of the
Arab League of States for Palestinian refugees, or the 1967 Organization of
African Unity Protocol that guarantees protection and assistance to international
refugees. However, the link between population dynamics and international vio-
lence has been discussed mainly within the context of the Palestinian refugee
case, and the refugee flows in the Middle East clearly highlight the interconnec-
tion between migration and displacement.58 Indeed, the treatment of Palestinian
refugees has become a central issue to the extent that it can be taken as symbolic
of Arabism and pan-Arab politics as a whole. The equation between Arabism
and the Palestinian cause started with the first exodus of 1948, as shown by
Constantin Zurayq, the Syrian historian who first coined the word nakba.59
Even though Saudi Arabia was not a United Nations Relief and Works
Agency (UNRWA) asylum country and did not recognize the Casablanca
Protocol status for Palestinian refugees, the kingdom hosted Palestinian refu-
gees as early as 1948. The state was simply applying the Protocols’ provisions
de facto through a liberal entry and residence regime for Palestinian exiles of
1948 and 1967. As a token gesture of Arab solidarity and an act of informal
diplomacy, the Arab managers of the ARAMCO recruitment sections opened
an office in Beirut in 1948 in order to reach the Palestinian population. After
1967, large numbers of Palestinian refugees were recruited and sponsored by
the ARAMCO, then a public-private Saudi-US company.60
To a lesser extent, Saudi Arabia supported the Eritrean cause in the war of
independence against Ethiopia (1962–1991) by financing the guerrillas but also
by facilitating entry and residence for exiles and guerrilla fighters. Arab
countries in general, and the Gulf countries and Saudi Arabia in particular, sup-
ported the Eritrean guerrillas from the 1960s to the 1990s on an ideological basis
and allowed Eritrean refugees to enter and settle in the oil-rich countries using
migration politics as an asylum policy by proxy. Eritrean refugees were con-
sidered as Arabs oppressed by a colonial Christian power (Ethiopia) supported
by both Israel and the United States until the Marxist revolution led by Haile
Mariam Mengestu in 1974. Their struggle was understood in a geopolitical
context and was seen by the Arab states around the Red Sea as a key strategic
move toward protecting the “Arab identity of the Red Sea,” which they consider
an “Arab lake.”61 Rather than straightforward political support through explicit
asylum rights, the stance of the Saudi government was to welcome Eritrean
migrants; in turn, the financial flows of remittance from the kingdom became
a crucial source of support for the freedom fighters.
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Even though the historiography remains controversial on the emergence of
an Arab political culture of the guerrilla, the intellectual, financial, and political
connections between the first political movements promoting independence and
the Arab world is clearly established. Arabicized elites from Eritrea gathered
within the Muslim league in 1946, the Harekat Tahrir Iritriya (Eritrean
Liberation Movement) in 1958, and the Eritrean Liberation Front, and
started to claim autonomy from the Ethiopian domination that was formally
established over the former Italian colony after the British army withdrew in
1952.62 The essence of the political culture of the guerrilla has drawn the atten-
tion of historians and political scientists up to now.63 Primary sources and his-
torical accounts in Arabic strongly defend the idea of an Arab identity of the
independence struggle based on the support granted to the guerrilla by neigh-
boring Arab countries. The discourse produced by political leaders in the
1960s and the 1970s was strongly influenced by Arabism and by the ideological
resources it provides for claiming independence.64 Therefore, the presentation
of Eritrea as an Arab country and of Eritreans as Arabs was acknowledged
as a regional political commonplace, which led to the blooming of propaganda
and pseudo-historical literature on Eritrea’s “Arabness.”65
As a consequence of this political emphasis on the Arab identity of the
guerrilla and of the Eritrean people, from the 1960s to the 1980s most of this
Eritrean population, although already covered by the prima facie refugee
status granted by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees,
entered Saudi Arabia either on a pilgrimage visa or without any documentation
at all. Two royal decrees issued in 1974 and 1979 temporarily granted the
Eritrean Liberation Front (ELF) the status of kafil (sponsor) for Eritreans
who wished to come and reside in the kingdom. Sponsorship being one of the
main constraints on individual immigration for persons without a job contract,
the royal decree therefore served as an “asylum policy” by proxy for Eritrean
exiles. At the time, the residence permit (iqama) to be obtained through the
Ministry of Interior was free of charge for Eritreans, contrary to the regular pro-
cedure. The iqama is issued on presentation of an ELF letter recognizing the
petitioner as Eritrean.66
The 1979 Royal Decree was abolished in 1981, but various public services,
including the Service of Passport and Immigration at the Ministry of Interior
and the regional offices of the Ministry of Labor, remained particularly tolerant
in their treatment of Eritrean “immigrants” till the beginning of the 1990s.
Between 1984 and 1985, the status of kafil was briefly granted again to the
ELF thanks to the outcome of the Jeddah conference, gathering all Eritrean
independence parties and factions in exile.
The support for Eritrean exiles is embodied by a series of semiformal or
informal administrative practices, which can be traced in the documentation
gathered in local Sudanese administration where former Eritrean refugees
registered after leaving Eritrea before migrating to the oil-rich countries.67
Eritreans could enter the country without a predefined job contract or prospec-
tive employer; the procedural burden of immigration registration was alleviated;
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and the public administration showed tolerance vis-a`-vis undocumented
migrants.
The Circulation of African Exiles: Travel Documents and Arab Politics
The concept of a regional citizenship was theorized by Zaki al-Arsuzi68 in 1965
but never gave way to concrete administrative or political measures, such as an
“Arab passport.” The Arab National Convention on Nationality, adopted on
April 5, 1965, fell well short of Arsuzi’s hopes by asserting that whoever pos-
sessed the nationality of any of the states of the League of Arab States was
Arab (article 1). The definition chosen was tautological and merely institutional.
It failed to address the question of infra- or supranational identity by referring,
once again, to nation-states as sole providers of identity.69 In spite of the
mention of Arab identity in preambles to all national constitutions in the
region excepting Israel and Turkey,70 Arab nationals still needed passports or
identity documents to circulate in the region. The processes of migrant and
refugee identification in the region remain partially informal nonetheless, due
to weak or rather inefficient state bureaucracies. In this context, rather than a
rational-legal set of screening procedures assigning each individual a permanent
label, identification has become a political process highly sensitive to represen-
tational variations but with very pragmatic outcomes, including the right to
access a territory.
As Jane Caplan and John Torpey have demonstrated, the categories under
which foreign nationals are labeled indicate the limits and extent of their rights,
duties, and freedom of movement.71 In the case of the Arab world in the 1970s
and 1980s, the relative informality of registration and identification of migrants
was linked to prevailing social, political, and cultural representations of the self
and of others. The administrative procedures operate in a context in which
formal bilateral or regional agreements on labor migration are virtually
nonexistent.
In this context, it is particularly interesting to study the case of this marginal
category of migrants in the Arab world. The history of Eritrean refugees in the
Arab world illustrates the power of social representations of Arabness and indir-
ect asylum policies. Through both state and nonstate activism, Eritrean exiles
negotiated conditions of access and mobility for Eritreans in the Arab world
during the 1960s and 1970s. The Eritrean transnational advocacy networks
were managed by guerrilla parties like the ELF and the networks of partisan
politics aimed at securing freedom of movement and military and financial
support for the Eritrean war of independence. For this purpose, in the 1960s
and 1970s parties in exile based in Cairo, Khartoum, Sana’a, and Beirut devel-
oped and communicated a political discourse proclaiming the Arabness of the
Eritrean nation and the Arab identity of the people of Eritrea.72 In 1964,
during a press conference in Damascus, Idris M. Adem, Eritrean guerrilla
leader in exile, asserted that “there are no others in Eritrea but Arab citizens,”73
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and Eritrean political figures hammer throughout their discourses and writings
the Arabness of Eritrea and of Eritreans.74
The consequences of this activism can be seen in the quasi-asylum policy
that some Arab countries developed in favor of Eritrean refugees. They could
enter Arab countries that did not recognize the mandate of the United
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and the international
refugee status linked to the 1951 Convention, and they were granted working
and residence permits. Most Eritreans were registered as refugees in Sudan or
Yemen, countries that had signed the 1951 Geneva Convention and hosted
UNHCR offices75 and were given Convention Travel Documents76 (CTDs)
that allowed them to leave their first country of asylum and travel around the
region. In the context of pan-Arab politics, the government of Sudan issued
vast numbers of CTDs that were valid in the Arab world, contrary to the pre-
scription of UNHCR regulations.77 Most CTDs observed in the
Commissioner of Refugees (COR) archives in Khartoum mention “Arab
countries” or “Arab countries excluding Israel and South Africa,” which reflects
the positioning of the League of Arab States in regional politics. CTDs were
used as passports and were recognized and accepted as legitimate travel docu-
ments for Eritrean refugees, even in the oil-rich countries that had not signed
the 1951 Convention but were the preferred destination of secondary migration
for Sudanese-based exiles. COR archives host numbers of expired CTDs from
the 1970s and the 1980s in cardboard boxes that display visas and stamps
from oil-rich countries, some of them even bearing handwritten enumerations
of the number, names, and ages of dependents. Some also bear the handwritten
note “to accompany employer” alongside the visa and residence stamp deliv-
ered by the Service of Passport and Immigration of the receiving country. In
this context, the CTD is not just the exact equivalent of a national passport, it
also serves as a job contract and a residence permit; thus, the immigration
policy can be understood as an informal asylum policy.
The liberal asylum policy of the state of Sudan gave rise to difficulties and
even breaches of international law in the Middle East, where the right to a
national passport and freedom to travel were much more restricted than a refu-
gee’s right to a CTD. Sudanese CTDs for Eritreans started raising suspicion in
Western countries in the late 1970s, but they remained valid in the Middle East
until the beginning of the 1990s and sometimes even beyond the end of the war
and the independence of Eritrea in 1993.78 The analysis of the individual docu-
mentation of labor migrants, and in this case refugees, supports the writing of a
social history of mobility that links micro and informal institutions to the struc-
tures and culture of Middle Eastern political history.
Conclusion
Macro and micro analyses of migration and asylum trends argue in favor of a
reappraisal of the role of oil-rich states in shaping regional integration.
Despite the widely acknowledged demise of Arab regional integration as a
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political and institutional process, the achievements of informal and de facto
integration processes linked to labor migration and refugee movements need
to be emphasized. Behind the well-known tones of pan-Arabism and the insti-
tutional buildup of the 1960s and 1970s, the main actors of regionalism in the
Middle East were in fact labor migrants and refugees. The Middle East case
helps us reassess the historical importance of mobility as a political phenomenon
and the role of migrants and refugees as political actors. The structures and pat-
terns of regional migration systems are determined not only by economic factors
but also by political incentives, whether these be formulated as explicit public
policy and diplomacy or implemented through administrative practices shaped
by political representations. Migration policy embodied in a wide spectrum of
formal and informal practices contributed to the regional political dynamics,
and migrants and refugees could be considered essential historical actors, at
the regional and the local levels, in both sending and receiving countries.
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